A distinction is drawn between two forms of prospective behavior, goal-directed behavior and future planning, in terms of the motivational relevance of the goal or outcome of the behavior. Goal-directed behavior is relevant to the animal's current motivational state, whereas future planning refers to action taken in the service of future needs. Two criteria are employed to distinguish goal-directed actions from habitual behavior. Performance must be sensitive, fi rst, to the current incentive value of the goal as assessed by the outcome revaluation procedure (goal criterion) and, second, to the instrumental contingency between the action and the outcome (instrumental criterion). Both associative and cognitive accounts of goal-directed behavior are considered. Discussion of future planning focuses primarily two accounts of the sensitivity behavior to future consequences: the mnemonic-associative theory and the mental time travel account. Although the avian food-caching paradigm has yielded evidence for mnemonic-associative theory, support for mental time travel in animals comes largely by default. The empirical evaluation of mental time travel awaits a more detailed and articulated specifi cation of the underlying cognitive processes.
Introduction
The problem of intentionality has haunted biology and psychology for centuries. The exquisite adaptation of both animal morphology and behavior appeared to demand the hand of an intentional agent, which in pre-Darwinian times took the form of a divine creator. Thus in his 1691 volume, "The Wisdom of God Manifest in the Works of Creation," John Ray claimed that animals are "acted and driven to bring about Ends which [they] themselves aim not at (so far as we can discern) but are directed to." Of course, two centuries later Darwin vitiated a role for a creator of phylogenetic adaptations by demonstrating how manifest "design" could be brought through a process of selection by consequences, which in case of natural selection were those for reproductive fi tness. The challenge to any form of natural intentionality was then fully realized fi fty years later when E. L. Thorndike (1911) argued that adaptation through behavioral learning also operated through a process of selection by consequences in the form of his "Law of Effect." According to the Law of Effect, an animal does not perform a behavior that yields a goal with the intent of gaining access to the goal, but rather because past experience with the behavior-goal contingency has simply selected that behavior through a stimulusresponse/reinforcement mechanism.
Although readily embracing the elegance of natural selection, both psychologists and biologists have been reluctant to endorse the demystifi cation of intentionality offered by the Law of Effect. Consider one recent example-a fascinating study of foraging by wild baboons (Noser and Byrne 2007) . On the basis of observing that the baboons take effi cient routes to valuable out-ofsight food resources while ignoring less valuable ones, Noser and Byrne concluded that "our data provide evidence of goal-directed travel and advanced planning during foraging by chacma baboons." However, they cannot fully escape the shadow of the Law of Effect and later acknowledged that "it is possible that the behavior of our baboons was shaped by the repeated experience that rewards from fi g trees are larger in the early morning and smaller in the course of the day" (Noser and Byrne 2007:265) The moral of this example is that the intentional status of behavior can rarely, if ever, be determined by the observation in the natural environment. Natural behaviors always appear purposive and goal directed even if the underlying mechanism is selection by fi tness or by reinforcement.
Goal-Directed Behavior
Faced with the ambiguous intentional status of natural behavior, my colleagues and I have argued for two criteria in determining whether or not a particular response is goal directed (de Wit and Dickinson 2009) : the goal criterion and the instrumental criterion.
The Goal Criterion
If a response is to be goal directed, it must not only be "directed" at the goal, it must also be sensitive to whether or not this outcome is currently a goal for the animal or, in the psychological jargon, to the current incentive value of the outcome. If the response were performed irrespective of whether or not its outcome currently has value, it would be a misnomer to characterize it as goal directed. The status of a response with respect to this goal criterion is assessed by the outcome revaluation procedure.
Application of this procedure can be illustrated by the fi rst study to demonstrate the goal-directed status of an instrumental response by the outcome revaluation procedure. Adams and Dickinson (1981) trained hungry rats to press a lever to receive one of two types of food pellet, either a sugar pellet or a grain pellet, while the other type was delivered independently of responding. Having established lever pressing, we then devalued either the pellet that was contingent on the response or the noncontingent pellet by conditioning a food aversion to it. It is important to note that this aversion conditioning was conducted in the absence of the lever so that it could not have a direct impact on lever pressing.
If the lever pressing was truly goal directed, then the rats should have been less inclined to press the lever, when once again given the opportunity to do so, if the contingent, rather than the noncontingent, pellet had been devalued. Only the contingent pellet could have acted as a goal for lever pressing (see discussion of the instrumental criterion below) and, therefore, if this response is goal directed, devaluation of the contingent outcome should have reduced the propensity to perform the response as this type of food pellet would no longer have had the status of a goal. When subsequently given access to the lever again, the rats pressed less if the contingent rather than the noncontingent pellet was devalued, thereby establishing this response as goal directed by the goal criterion. It is important to note that this devaluation test has to be conducted in absence of the outcome so that we can be sure that performance during the test is not subject to the direct selection by its consequences in the manner envisaged by the Law of Effect. If the devalued pellet was presented contingent lever pressing during the test, the reduced performance could be due to the fact that the pellet is no longer capable of directly selecting the response.
Behavioral Autonomy
The importance of the goal criterion is evident from the fact that one and the same response can be both sensitive and insensitive to outcome devaluation depending upon a number of factors. When performance of the response is independent or autonomous of the current value of the outcome in the revaluation test, the response is characterized as a habit and, following Thorndike, it is generally assumed that the habit learning involves the acquisition of stimulusresponse associations, such as between the sight of the lever and pressing it, through a process of reinforcement by the outcome. Because the animal does not encode or learn about the identity of the outcome in the stimulus-response/ reinforcement mechanism, habitual behavior cannot be directly sensitive to a change in value of the outcome. The reality of the distinction between goaldirected and habitual behavior has been fi rmly established by neurobiological dissociations (Balleine and O'Doherty 2009), which are too numerous to document here in detail. For example, behavior remains goal directed under conditions that normally establish it as habitual (insensitive to outcome revaluation) following lesions of certain prefrontal and striatal structures of the rat.
By contrast, prefrontal and striatal dysfunction in other areas appears to abolish sensitivity to outcome revaluation.
Whether or not goal-directed or habitual control predominates depends upon the training regime (Dickinson 1985) . Over-training of a single response often produces behavioral autonomy and habitual control, as does training under a low contingency between response and outcome rates. By contrast, responding remains goal directed in spite of extended training when the animal has a choice between two different responses that yield different outcomes. There is also a marked developmental trajectory for goal-directed behavior in children with instrumental responding by those younger than two years being predominantly habitual (Klossek et al. 2008) . Finally, stress promotes the expression of habits over goal-directed action (Schwabe and Wolf 2009).
Although it is generally assumed that goal-directed and habitual learning occur concurrently, we are still uncertain about how these two forms of control interact in determining performance. My colleagues and I have argued that both learning systems contribute to performance so that the overall rate responding is a sum of the goal-directed and habitual components (Dickinson et al. 1995) . By contrast, Daw and colleagues (2005) have proposed that behavior is selectively controlled by one processer at a time. The arbitration between the two systems refl ects the uncertainty about the value of a response produced by each system with the selected controller being the one that yields the most certain prediction.
Finally, it should be noted that, as yet, no one has distinguished goal-directed from habitual behavior in terms of its overt properties: a goal-directed lever press looks much the same as a habitual one. It is the absence of any overt signature of the intentional status of behavior that requires the deployment of the goal criteria through the outcome revaluation paradigm. Moreover, the concept of the stimulus-response/reinforcement process mediating habitual behavior has supported the development of reinforcement learning algorithms that endow synthetic agents and robots with illusionary intentionality (Sutton and Barto 1998).
The Instrumental Criterion
The second, instrumental criterion is more contentious and is intended to capture the claim that, to be goal directed, the behavior must be "directed" to the goal at a psychological level rather than just at a functional level. This claim is cashed out in terms of sensitivity to the instrumental contingency or, in other words, to the causal relationship between the response and the goal. I argue that, unless the response is sensitive to this relationship, there is little justifi cation characterizing it as "directed" at a goal, at least in terms of the nature of the processes mediating the behavior.
The manifest intentionality of behavior does not necessarily indicate whether it is goal directed by the instrumental criterion. Consider the case of simple approach to a goal, which in terms of its manifest properties, appears to be prototypically goal directed. There is, however, good evidence that in many cases goal approach is not sensitive to the causal relationship between the behavior and access to the goal. In his classic "looking-glass" experiment Hershberger (1986) fed chicks at a distinctive food bowl to establish it as a goal before placing them in one of two environments that arranged different relationships between the behavior of the chick and the bowl. In the normal environment, the food bowl retreated from the chick at half the rate at which the chicks approached it so that the birds had no problem in catching up to the bowl as they approached it. By contrast, in the "looking-glass" environment the bowl retreated from the chicks at twice the rate in which they approached it so that, to get the food, the birds had to learn to run away from it. When they did so, the bowl caught up to them at twice the rate they retreated from it. This, the birds never learned to do, suggesting that the approach behavior was not under the control of the causal or instrumental relationship with the goal, but rather was a response simply elicited by the sight of a distal stimulus, in this case the food bowl, through its association with food.
The "looking-glass" environment implements what is called the bidirectional control for the instrumental status of a response. For a response to be instrumental, an animal must be capable of learning not only the target response (e.g., approach) but also its opposite (e.g., retreat) depending upon which response is required for access to the goal. By this criterion, the instrumental status of the manipulation of levers and similar objects by rats has been established (Dickinson et al. 1996) . However, the bidirectional control procedure is not the only way of addressing the instrumental criterion. In fact, any demonstration that the form of the response is controlled by its causal relationship with the goal fulfi lls this criterion, such as appropriate tool selection or manufacture. For example, Manrique and colleagues (2010) have recently reported that great apes will select between fl exible and rigid tools based on which type of tool is required to gain the goal. Similarly, demonstrations that corvids will both select and manufacture the appropriate tools for a task provide evidence in favor of their instrumental status (Bird and Emery 2009; Weir et al. 2003) .
The instrumental criterion may be thought to be too stringent because it excludes much behavior that we might wish to characterize as goal directed in terms of its manifest and functional properties, such as approach to a distal stimulus signaling the location of food. For example, Carruthers (2004; see also Allen and Bekoff 1995; Heyes and Dickinson 1995) has challenged the claim that sensitivity to the instrumental contingency is necessary for the attribution of means/ends reasoning and a belief-desire psychology to an animal. As he notes, "why should we not say that the animal behaves as it does because it wants something and believes that the desired thing can be found at a certain represented location on the (mental) map" (Carruthers 2004:211) and leave the causation implicit, for example, in "fl ying-in-that-direction action schemata" of a bird. There is, however, little point in arguing about the defi nition of goal directed in this respect, other than to note that certain behaviors do vary in their sensitivity to the causal relationship with a goal and that such sensitivity adds an important degree of fl exibility to the concept of directedness, which is the focus of the theoretical discussion of goal-directed behavior in the next section.
Theories of Goal-Directed Behavior
To meet the goal and instrumental criteria, an animal has to learn about and encode the relationship between the response (R) and outcome (O), because in the absence of such knowledge it is impossible for the animal to respond immediately to a change in the incentive value of the outcome. There are three theories of goal-directed behavior, two associative and one cognitive.
Ideomotor Theory
This theory derives from William James' classic account of volition (James 1890) and was developed by Pavlov and his students (Asratyan 1974) . The central claim is that the idea or thought of a goal automatically activates the response that caused this outcome in the past. Moreover, it is usually assumed that this activation is mediated by an O-R association. According to this theory, the sight of a particular fruit tree brings to mind the thought of its fruit which then elicits the foraging behavior that enabled the animal in the past to gather this fruit.
The most compelling evidence for the operation of this ideomotor process comes from studies of so-called outcome-specifi c Pavlovian-instrumental transfer. This transfer refl ects the fact that a stimulus that has been associated with a particular outcome is capable of selectively activating a response that has been independently trained with the same outcome. As a result of this training, the stimulus activates a representation of the outcome, which then activates the response through the instrumental O-R association. Although this transfer establishes the role of the O-R association in the control of behavior, it is clear that this processes does not mediate the role of the incentive value of the goal in that, surprisingly, the magnitude of the transfer is unaffected by devaluation of the outcome (Rescorla 1994). Rather the O-R association seems to mediate priming of the response rather than its selection for execution.
Associative-Cybernetic Theory
The alternative theory simply reverses the role of the response and outcome. Accordingly, the sight of the fruit tree elicits the thought of foraging in it, which in turn retrieves a representation of its fruit. It is this retrieval process through an R-O association that gives the process its associative character.
Having retrieved the thought of the fruit, its current incentive value is determined, which, if positive, feeds back to activate the response representation, thereby causing it execution. It is this feedback that renders the process of response selection cybernetic, and for this reason, my colleagues and I have characterized this account as an associative-cybernetic model (e.g., Dickinson 1994; de Wit and Dickinson 2009). To the best of my knowledge, this account was fi rst advanced by E. L. Thorndike (1931) and has been developed as a "simulation" model in the fi eld of cognitive science (Sutton and Barto 1981; Hesslow 2002) . The feedback process envisaged by the model bears some similarity to Damasio's (1996) "somatic marker" account of decision making. As yet, there is no direct empirical evidence for the contribution of this process to the goal-directed behavior of animals.
Cognitive Theory
The cognitive account has been motivated by the apparent rationality of goaldirected action (Heyes and Dickinson 1990) . Although these accounts differ in their detail, in one way or another most assume that goal-directed behavior is mediated by a belief that the response causes the outcome and a desire for the outcome. These two representations are then assumed to interact through a process of practical inference to generate an intention to perform the response. Again, there is little direct evidence in favor of such accounts, although there are empirical claims that rats are capable of causal inferences involving instrumental actions. Without going into details, Blaisdell and colleagues claimed that rats show differential responses to a stimulus depending on whether or not their own behavior had produced it in a way that refl ects a causal inference (Blaisdell et al. 2006; Leising et al. 2008 ; but see Dwyer et al. 2009 ). Moreover, examples of tool selection or manufacture would require a cognitive account if a role for causal understanding can be convincingly demonstrated.
Future Planning
Over a decade ago, Suddendorf and Corballis (1997) drew the attention of comparative psychology and cognition to an important distinction between different forms of future-directed behavior. The examples of goal-directed behavior that I have so far discussed are limited in two respects. First, the causal relationship between action and outcome operates across a limited temporal interval. Delaying a food reward by more than a minute or so prevents the acquisition of lever pressing by rats (in the absence of "bridging" stimuli) (Dickinson et al. 1992 ). Second, goal-directed responses gain access to resources that are relevant to the animal's current motivational state: hungry or thirsty rats pressing levers to get access to food or fl uids. However, there are numerous examples of animal behavior that, at least at a functional level, appear to transcend both these constraints by taking actions now to yield outcomes that serve future needs states. For example, a variety of birds cache surplus food to recover it hours, days, or even weeks later when hungry. To the extent that such behavior depends upon cognitive processes, it clearly transcends the type of associative goal-directed theoretical machinery outlined above and can be viewed as an example of future planning.
Suddendorf and Corballis made two important claims about future planning that transcend the motivational and temporal constraints on goal-directed action. First, following Bischof-Köhler, they argued that "only humans can fl exibly anticipate their own future mental states of need and act now to secure them" (Suddendorf and Corballis 2008). Set within a motivational context, the claim is that the capacity to act in the service of future rather than current needs through future planning is unique to humans. Second, they argued that future planning involves a set of cognitive processes that support mental time travel.
Bischof-Köhler Hypothesis
Since Suddendorf and Corballis drew attention to the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis, a number of experimentalists have challenged its claim. The fi rst was reported by Naqshbandi and Roberts (2006), who manipulated the present and future motivational states by giving monkeys a choice between small and large food quantities followed by a period in which water was not available. The rationale assumed that the choice of the large quantity would have induced a state of thirst that could not be immediately satisfi ed, and therefore if monkeys can anticipate a future motivational state of thirst, they should have shown a paradoxical preference for the small food. In accord with this prediction, the monkeys learned to switch their preference away from the large to the small food. Correia et al. (2007) examined the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis using a foodcaching paradigm with scrub-jays by explicitly varying relative incentives values of two types of food at caching in the morning and at recovery in the afternoon. The incentive values were manipulated by prefeeding one of the foods to reduce its value through specifi c satiety. The procedure contrasted the control of caching by the incentive value of a food at the time of caching with that at the time of recovery. On the fi rst day, the birds cached more of the non-prefed, and therefore more valuable food, a choice that refl ected the relative incentive values at the time of caching. However, the birds were then prefed the other food just prior to recovery in the afternoon, thereby dissociating the relative values of the two foods at caching and recovery. One food was valuable at the time of caching and the other at the time of recovery. At issue, then, was which food would the jays choose to cache on the second day? The fact that they switched their preference to caching the food that had been valuable at recovery on the previous day rather than the one that was valuable at the time of caching demonstrates that they are capable of acting in the service of future need state. Therefore, caching was predominantly controlled by the incentive value at the time of recovery rather than the value at the time of caching.
These are just two of a number of studies that have challenged the comparative claims of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis. However, although this aspect of the hypothesis has not withstood empirical examination, what it has done is to highlight a form of prospective behavior that lies outside the scope of the theories of goal-directed behavior outlined above, which all seek to explain the sensitivity of behavior to the current motivational state. The question then becomes whether or not such future planning requires radically different processes from those mediating goal-directed behavior. The mental time travel theory claims that it does.
Mental Time Travel
The three theories of goal-directed behavior assume that such actions are mediated by some form of generic representation of the relationship between the response and the outcome, be it an O-R or R-O association or a causal belief. Within the taxonomy of human memory, such representations are most akin to what is called semantic knowledge, general factual knowledge about the world, which stands in contrast to another form of human memory, episodic memory (Tulving 1972) . Episodic memory supports the recollection of specifi c past life events. The central claim of the mental time travel hypothesis is that episodic memory and future planning call on a common cognitive resource and that it is this resource that is uniquely human. Indeed, more recently, in their constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, Schacter et al. (2008) have explicitly argued that a function of episodic memory is to allow the simulation of future events through the construction of representations of possible future episodes on the basis of the memories of past ones.
From this theoretical perspective, the issue of whether animals are capable of true future planning comes down to the question of whether the nature of the specifi c cognitive processes mediates their future-directed behavior. The account offered by the mental time travel theory can be illustrated by reconsidering the processes that enabled the conditions at recovery to control caching by Corriea et al.'s scrub-jays. To recap, their jays cached two different types of food in the morning before being given the opportunity to recover them in the afternoon. Importantly, the relative incentive values of the two foods were manipulated at recovery by pre-feeding one of the foods to satiety just before the birds were given access to the caches sites. The critical fi nding was that on the next caching episode, the birds cached more of the food that had been most valuable at recovery on the preceding afternoon in spite of the fact that the current value of this food had been reduced by pre-feeding just before caching.
Mental time travel theory would explain this sensitivity to the conditions at recovery by arguing that on the second caching episode the birds remembered the recovery events on the previous day, thereby recalling that one type of food had a higher value at recovery. This episodic-like memory of the previous recovery then informed the birds' caching decisions. Although specifi c processes by which the memory of recovery controls the caching decisions remains unspecifi ed, it is reasonable that the bird should cache more of the food type that it remembers was valuable at recovery.
Although relatively little work has been done to determine the contributions of mental time travel to the control of behavior that has long-term consequences, de Kort et al. (2007) attempted an analysis in the case of food caching. Initially they allowed their jays to cache in one of two cache sites, A, while access to the other site, B, was blocked. At recovery next day, the bird had access to both sites but found that its caches in A had been transferred to B. After one more caching and recovery cycle, the birds were given a third opportunity to cache but now both sites were available. At issue was: which site, A or B, would bird choose for its caches? According to the mental time travel account, the birds should have shown a preference for caching in B. When faced with the opportunity to cache in A and B, they should have remembered the recovery from B on the previous day, a memory that should have biased them to caching in B.
The initial results favored the mental time travel account in that the birds did in fact cache more in B than A. However, this conclusion is based on the assumption that the birds' choice refl ected a preference for caching in B rather than an avoidance of A, but this turned out not to be the case. When a third novel site, C, was available during the caching test, the birds cached just as much in C as in B, although they could not have any memory of recovering from C. What they appeared to be doing, therefore, was simply avoiding caching in A.
Mnemonic-Associative Theory
How then are we to explain the apparent future planning exhibited by Corriea et al.'s birds? One possibility would be to shift the locus of the episodic-like retrieval. The mental time travel account, at least as I have articulated it, assumes that the animal retrieves a memory of the past outcome of an action at the time when it is deciding whether to perform that action again. An alternative is the theory of long-delay learning developed by Lett (1975) , which assumes that the action is recalled at the time of the outcome. The operation of this mnemonic-associative theory can be illustrated again by reference to the Corriea et al. study. Mnemonic-associative theory would assume that at the time of recovery on the fi rst day, the jays recalled caching the two foods in the morning. Because the prefeeding ensured that one of the foods had higher relative value than the other at the time of recovery, the memory of caching this food was associated with a high incentive value, which in turn enhanced the propensity to perform this behavior again through the associative goaldirected mechanisms that I have already discussed. Similarly, the avoidance of the pilfered cache site observed by the de Kort et al. (2007) study is explained by assuming that the memory of caching in the pilfered site at retrieval was associated with the absence of expected caches, a frustrative experience, which would have subsequently punished the propensity to cache in this site again. Indeed, van der Vaart and colleagues (2010) have recently presented a formal model that simulates the results of de Kort et al. using memory-based reward and punishment processes. Furthermore, their simulations demonstrate that the punishment process may not be required as long as the birds have a propensity to avoid returning to recently visited cache sites.
Both mental time travel theory and mnemonic-associative theory assume that episodic-like memory plays a central role in future planning but the mnemonic locus differs in the two theories. According to mental time travel theory, the animal recalls the last experience of the anticipated future outcome at the time when it is planning its actions, whereas mnemonic-associative theory assumes that it is the recall of the actions at the time of a previous outcome that is crucial. The studies of caching that I have discussed so far appear to favor mnemonic-associative theory over mental time travel. Indeed, it is well established that scrub-jays retrieve a detailed episodic-like memory of caching particular foods in specifi c locations at the time of recovery (de Kort et al. 2005) . However, there are at least two cases of apparent future planning by animals that are problematic for mnemonic-associative theory in that there is no memory of the action to be recalled.
Following Mulcahy and Call (2006) , Osvath and Osvath (2008) demonstrated that great apes, when give an opportunity to gain food from an apparatus that required a tool to operate it, would select an appropriate tool in one context and then transport it to another context containing the feeding apparatus even though an hour or so intervened between that time of selection and the opportunity to deploy the tool. Crucially, Osvath and Osvath also demonstrated that the apes would select an appropriate novel tool for which they could have no prior memory.
The second example again comes from the food-caching paradigm. In a study by Raby et al. (2007) , jays learned across a series of days that they received either no food or a particular type of food in one place for breakfast, while receiving a different type breakfast food in another place on other days. Then, for the fi rst time they were given an opportunity to cache food in the two locations in the evening. Given that the birds could not anticipate where they would be at breakfast time on the next morning, the optimum future planning strategy would be to cache a particular food in the place where it had not been previously available, thereby ensuring that they had at least some food for breakfast the next morning. This future planning is again beyond the explanatory scope of the mnemonic-associative theory because during training the birds could not have any memories of caching in the two locations, and therefore could not have associated memories of these actions with their consequences. However, the birds did in fact show a pattern of caching that matched the optimal future planning.
I have not described these two experiments because they provide unequivocal evidence for mental time travel-clearly they do not. Shettleworth (pers. comm.) has suggested that, rather planning for breakfast, scrub-jays may simply have a propensity to cache a particular food type in a given location that differs from the foods that have been previously associated with that location, a strategy that would provide more uniform distribution of resources. Similarly, the apes must have selected the novel tools on the basis of their functionality, which may provide basis for generalization between the training and test tools. Whatever the status of these results is with respect to mental time travel, they share a common strategy of attempting to provide evidence for mental time travel by ruling out the processes of the mnemonic-associative theory. To go beyond this limited strategy, however, we need a more detailed and specifi c account of how the cognitive and inferential processes of mental time travel enable a recollection of a goal event to select the action that should bring about that event in the future.
Summary
Although there is no doubt that we and other animals have a Cartesian stimulus-response beast machine buried within our psychology, it is also clear that for many animals this machine cohabits with an intentional agent capable of purposive action. Some of the best evidence for this dual psychology comes from advances in our understanding of animal instrumental action. Under certain conditions, instrumental behavior is purely habitual and autonomous of the current value of the goal that established it in the fi rst place. Under others, however, animal action is truly goal directed in that it meets both the goal and instrumental criteria. In such cases, the behavior must be mediated by conjoint representations of the relationship between the action and the goal, whether this be associative or cognitive, and of the current incentive value of the goal.
Goal-directed action can be distinguished from another form of prospective behavior, future planning, in terms of the motivational relevance of the goal. Goal-directed behavior is relevant to the animal's current motivational state, whereas future planning refers to action taken in the service of future needs. The discussion of future planning focused two accounts of the sensitivity behavior to future consequences: the mnemonic-associative theory and the mental time travel account. I belabored the distinction between mental time travel and mnemonic-associative theory because it is clear that an understanding of future planning depends upon a detailed analysis of the psychological processes that enable animals to act for future needs. At present, there is empirical evidence in favor of both theories. However, a theoretical lacuna remains at the heart of mental time travel theory. Whereas mnemonic-associative theory provides an associative theory to integrate episodic-like recall with action selection, there is no psychological machinery within mental time travel to specify how the appropriate action is selected given the recall of a previous goal episode. Further empirical investigation awaits a plausible account of action selection within mental time travel.
